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Abstract
A blockchain faces two fundamental challenges. It must motivate users
to maintain the system while preventing a minority of these users from
colluding and gaining disproportionate control. Many popular pub-
lic blockchains use monetary incentives to encourage users to behave
appropriately. But these same incentive schemes create more prob-
lems than they solve. Mining rewards cause centralization in proof of
work chains such as Bitcoin. Validator rewards and punishments invite
attacks in proof of stake chains. This paper argues why these incen-
tive schemes are detrimental to blockchain. It considers a range of
other systems—some of which incorporate monetary incentives, some
of which do not—to confirm that monetary incentives are neither nec-
essary nor sufficient for good user behavior.
1 Introduction
A blockchain implements a decentralized and distributed ledger. Users up-
date this ledger by posting transactions to a network of their peers, who
collect the transactions into batches known as blocks. These blocks are se-
quentially chained together to create a blockchain, the record of all accepted
transactions [12].
There may be many copies of the blockchain at different places in the
network. The system must propagate changes to these copies across the
network to keep all of the blockchains synchronized. The system must also
resolve conflicts, such as forking, where multiple users add different new
blocks to their copies of the chain simultaneously. In such cases, the system
must use some mechanism to resolve the conflicts and establish consensus on
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what the correct ledger is. Most popular blockchains, including Bitcoin and
Ethereum, use a longest-chain heuristic to choose between competing copies
of the ledger. Users replace their current copy if and only if they discover a
longer valid blockchain.
A primary obstacle for establishing fair consensus in public blockchains
is the Sybil attack, where users magnify their influence by creating multiple
aliases in the system [6]. These attacks are possible because the accounts are
anonymous, making it impossible to tell if the same person is behind many
seemingly unique addresses. By coordinating across their multiple accounts,
Sybil attackers can control, delay, or even prevent consensus.
2 Proof of Work
Two methods have been introduced to prevent Sybil attacks on blockchains.
The first, known as proof of work, was proposed in 2008 by person(s) under
the pseudonym Shatoshi Nakamoto [12]. Proof of work uses a pricing func-
tion—a function which is difficult to compute but easy to check—to slow the
rate at which the ledger is updated [7]. Users must compute this function
before they can add the next block to the chain. This prevents Sybil attacks
because it is equally computationally intensive to compute the function from
one account as it is from multiple accounts.
The pricing function introduces a significant cost to using the system.
Adding a block to Bitcoin requires specialized and expensive equipment that
consumes enormous amounts of electrical energy. Bitcoin mining consumed
2.55 gigawatts of power in 2018, nearly as much as the country of Ireland
that same year [16].
To offset the anticipated cost, Nakamoto added mining rewards to Bit-
coin. These rewards are cash incentives (in the Bitcoin currency) paid to
the user who computes the pricing function first.
However, mining rewards have had unfortunate side effects. To ease the
burden of the high-cost computation, users have begun to collaborate in
mining pools, where they pool their computational resources to solve the
puzzles together. This benefits the users because it ensures a more steady
stream of income. But it centralizes control of the Bitcoin ecosystem because
individual users no longer act independently.
As of June 2018, over 80 % of Bitcoin mining was performed by six mining
pools, five of which are based in China [10]. This geographic and compu-
tational centralization undermines the decentralized premise of blockchain
technology. It also increases the likelihood of a 51% attack, where a single
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user or coalition of users controls the majority of computational power and
therefore the fate of the chain [1].
3 Proof of Stake
Recognizing the energy inefficiencies in proof of work, a newer form of Sybil
resistance, known as proof of stake, replaces the pricing function with a
weighted lottery system [11]. The lottery selects a user to add the next
block with probability proportional to their stake in the system. Stake is
typically computed based on wealth, though implementations vary. Users
who have the most invested in the system therefore have the most control
over the chain.
Proof of stake has many advantages over proof of work. Users need not
buy expensive mining equipment to participate. The environmental impacts
are also low. Major cryptocurrencies like Ethereum [17] are considering
converting to stake-based chains [4]. But proof of stake is not without its
problems. It relies on an incentive scheme with its own troubling set of
issues.
In proof of work, mining rewards offset the computational cost of using
the system. In proof of stake, there is no pricing function to compute.
Therefore, there is no computational burden needing to be offset with a
reward. Yet proof of stake employs a system of validator rewards where
dividends are paid to the user who adds the next block.
In other words, proof of stake inherits proof of work’s incentive scheme,
despite the fact that it does not inherit the structural issues which necessi-
tated that scheme. These incentives are no longer justified by a pragmatic
balance of costs and benefits. Rather, they appear to be motivated by a
qualitative assumption about human behavior—that people are primarily
and reliably motivated by greed.
But catering to greed neglects and undermines other useful behaviors.
This produces new issues for blockchain.
3.1 Nothing at Stake Problem
Users want to be confident in the finality of their transactions. When a trans-
action is added to the ledger, it should not be arbitrarily changed or reversed.
However, transaction finality is not guaranteed during a fork. The system
will only reach consensus on one copy of the chain, abandoning any transac-
tions made on other copies. Users therefore cannot be confident that trans-
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actions will be committed until the system reaches consensus. They have an
interest in minimizing this uncertainty and reaching consensus quickly.
Validator rewards, however, create a financial incentive to delaying con-
sensus. Users can increase their likelihood of receiving a reward by building
on each copy of the blockchain during a fork. This ensures that they have a
chance to win the lottery and collect dividends regardless of which copy is
chosen. This tactic is economically attractive in proof of stake because there
is little cost involved in adding a new block. But it stalls consensus.
When all users build on all competing forks, the system cannot declare a
victor. Each fork will continue to develop, perpetuating uncertainty over the
true chain. This is called the nothing at stake problem [14]. The financial
upside to building on multiple forks makes it lucrative for honest users to de-
lay consensus and undermine transaction finality. Their short-term interest
in collecting rewards conflicts with their long-term interest in maintaining
the system.
3.2 Proposed Solutions to Nothing at Stake
Some strategies attempt to resolve the nothing at stake problem by punishing
users who build on multiple forks. In 2014, Ethereum founder Vitalik Buterin
created the Slasher algorithm which deducts from users’ deposits if they
misbehave [3]. However, the Slasher protocol requires users to be selected
for participation in the lottery well ahead of time1. This invites collusion
because users can get together in advance of their turn and agree to launch
a coordinated attack.
Other strategies simply punish any user who builds on the wrong fork.
The protocol punishes all errors indiscriminately, making no effort to distin-
guish unlucky users from those who intentionally build on multiple chains.
This will tend to discourage risk-averse users from extending the blockchain
and magnify the power of more risk-prone adversaries. It could also enable
adversaries to gang up on honest users. By manufacturing and communi-
cating a set of “bad” chains to their neighbors while refusing to pass on the
correct chain, adversaries can cause honest peers to be punished any time
they attempt to stake. This diminishes the wealth and influence of good
actors while ensuring that dividends and power flow to the adversaries.
Monetary punishments cannot resolve the problems created by monetary
rewards. They, too, create new issues in the process of solving the original.
1See Ethereum’s blog for more details [8].
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4 Incentives to Good Behavior
The detrimental impact of cash incentives is not unique to blockchain. Re-
search suggests that adding monetary incentives to a system does not always
motivate desired behaviors. On the other hand, desired behaviors are often
observed even when no cash motive is present.
4.1 Day Care in Israel
Monetary punishments are not sufficient to motivate desired behaviors. In
a well-known field study conducted during the 1990’s, researchers imposed
a fine on parents who were late to pick up their children from on a group
of day care centers in Israel [9]. They found that parents arrived 30 min-
utes later on average when they were being charged. This effect persisted
after the fine was lifted. These results contradicted the so-called “deterrence
hypothesis”—that introducing a penalty will reduce the penalized behavior
and leave everything else unchanged.
But monetary incentives don’t leave everything else unchanged. Accord-
ing to the researchers, money “change[s] the perception of the game.” Putting
a price on something doesn’t just affect how much weight it carries in peo-
ples’ calculations. It restructures the calculations themselves, which can lead
to unexpected and undesirable behaviors.
4.2 Secondary School in Colombia
Monetary rewards are also not sufficient to motivate desired behavior. In
a recent World Bank experiment, researchers offered cash compensation to
families in Colombia for sending their children to secondary school [2]. They
found that students in the reward program were 3% more likely to attend
school, but only 1% more likely to re-enroll, indicating that the cash motive
lost its power over time.
Moreover, non-participating students with siblings in the program were
3% less likely to attend school and 7.3% less likely to re-enroll. Rewarding
one subset of the family effectively served as a punishment for the other
members. This suggests that distributing rewards unevenly and infrequently
may actually discourage unrewarded users from participating in a system.
These findings don’t bode well for blockchain. Punishments might not
deter malicious actors. The efficacy of rewards may diminish over time—and
the positive impact on recipients may be dwarfed by the negative side-effects
experienced by other members of the system.
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4.3 Blood Supply in the US and UK
Cash incentives may not be necessary to motivate desired behavior. A study
by Richard Titmuss, a former professor at the London School of Economics,
compared the blood supply systems in the US and UK in the 1970’s [15].
The British system relied on voluntary donors, whereas the American system
was largely controlled by for-profit companies.
Titmuss discovered that the UK had a higher quantity and quality of
blood transfusions than the US. His conclusions suggest that a nonmar-
ket system based on donation may be more effective than a model which
compensates users financially.
4.4 Altruism in BitTorrent
A similar effect has been observed in distributed computing applications.
The BitTorrent service is a peer-to-peer file downloading system where users
share bandwidth with each other to increase the overall speed of their own
downloads [5]. Each peer has a network of neighbors with whom it cooperates
in a tit-for-tat manner—if a neighbor stops reciprocating, the other users will
remove it from their network.
Recent research suggests that some peers give more bandwidth than they
receive [13]. Users with large bandwidth appear to share more than the
minimal rate necessary for reciprocation. This acts like a “progressive tax”.
The more users benefit from the system, the more additional resources they
contribute to it.
Of course, the term “altruism” is a bit misleading here. BitTorrent users,
and even blood donors, are still motivated by self-interest. They are posi-
tioned to benefit from the systems they support. But these benefits are not
easily converted into financial terms. The benefit of receiving a blood trans-
fusion, for instance, can’t be transferred or used to purchase other goods.
Users are motivated by the intrinsic value of the system rather than by the
wealth it enables them to accrue. This intrinsic motive produces behaviors
that are beneficial to users and to the welfare of the system.
5 Conclusion
People need a reason to use and maintain a system, but that motive need
not be explicit or cash-based. Monetary incentives often fail to motivate
behavior in desired ways, and people willingly contribute to systems when
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no explicit incentive is provided. The utility of the system, not its auxiliary
rewards, is often a powerful enough motive.
Incentive schemes as they currently stand are not an effective solution
to blockchain’s problems. They do not discourage minorities from gaining
disproportionate power, as mining rewards encourage centralization in proof
of work-based chains. They do not effectively motivate users to maintain
the system, as validator rewards and punishments encourage honest users to
act in a manner that invites attacks and undermines the stability of proof of
stake-based chains. Further research is needed to develop blockchains that
achieve these goals while avoiding the downsides of incentives.
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